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In theory, Bayesian statistics is very simple. The posterior is proportional to the prior times likelihood. This gives the shape of the posterior, but it is not a density so it cannot be used for inference. The exact scale factor needed to make this a density can be found only in a few special cases. For other cases, the scale factor requires a numerical integration, which may be difficult when there are multiple parameters. So in practice, Bayesian statistics is more difficult, and this has held back its use for applied statistical problems. Computational Bayesian statistics has changed all this. It is based on the big idea that statistical inferences can be based on a random sample drawn from the posterior. The algorithms that are used allow us to draw samples from the exact posterior even when we only know its shape and we do not know the scale factor needed to make it an exact density. These algorithms include direct methods where a random sample drawn from an easily sampled distribution is reshaped by only accepting some candidate values into the final sample. More sophisticated algorithms are based on setting up a Markov chain that has the posterior as its long-run distribution. When the chain is allowed to run a sufficiently long time, a draw from the chain can be considered a random draw from the target (posterior) distribution. These algorithms are particularly well suited for complicated models with many parameters. This is revolutionizing applied statistics. Now applied statistics based on these computational Bayesian methods can be easily accomplished in practice.
Features of the text
This text grew out of a course I developed at Waikato University. My goal for that course and this text is to bring these exciting developments to upper-level undergraduate and first-year graduate students of statistics. This text introduces this big idea to students in such a way that they can develop a strategy for making statistical inferences in this way. This requires an understanding of the pitfalls that can arise when using this approach, what can be done to avoid them, and how to recognize them if they are occurring. The practitioner has many choices to make in using this approach. Poor choices will lead to incorrect inferences. Sensible choices will lead to satisfactory inferences in an efficient manner.
This text follows a step-by-step development. In Chapter 1 we learn about the similarities and differences between the Bayesian and the likelihood approaches to statistics. This is important because when a flat prior is used, the posterior has the same shape as the likelihood function, yet they have different methods for inferences. The Bayesian approach allows us to interpret the posterior as a probability density and it is this interpretation that leads to the advantages of this approach. In Chapter 2 we examine direct approaches to drawing a random sample from the posterior even when we only know its shape by reshaping a random sample drawn from another easily sampled density by only accepting some of the candidates into the final sample. These methods are satisfactory for models with only a few parameters provided the candidate density has heavier tails than the target. For models with many parameters direct methods become very inefficient. In these models, direct methods still may have a role as a small step in a larger Markov chain Monte carlo algorithm. In Chapter 3 we show how statistical inferences can be made from a random sample from the posterior in a completely analogous way to the corresponding inferences taken from a numerically calculated posterior. In Chapter 4 we study the distributions from the one-dimensional exponential family. When the observations come from a member of this family, and the prior is from the conjugate family, then the posterior will be another member of the conjugate family. It can easily be found by simple updating rules. We also look at the normal distribution with unknown mean and variance, which is a member of two-dimensional exponential family, and the multivariate normal and normal regression models. These exponential family cases are the only cases where the formula for the posterior can be found analytically. Before the development of computing, Bayesian statistics could only be done in practice in these few cases. We will use these as steps in a larger model. In Chapter 5 we introduce Markov chains. An understanding of Markov chains and their long-run behavior is needed before we study the more advanced algorithms in the book. Things that can happen in a Markov chain can also happen in a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) model. This chapter finishes with the Metropolis algorithm. This algorithm allows us take a Markov chain and find a new Markov chain from it that will have the target (posterior) as its longrun distribution. In Chapter 6 we introduce the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and show that how it performs depends on whether we use a random-walk or independent candidate density. We show how, in a multivariate case, we can either draw all the parameters at once, or blockwise, and that the Gibbs sampler is a special case of blockwise Metropolis-Hastings. In Chapter 7 we investigate how the mixing properties of the chain depend on the choice of the candidate density. We show how to find a heavy-tailed candidate density starting from the maximum likelihood estimator and matched curvature covariance matrix. We show that this will lead to a very efficient MCMC process. We investigate several methods for deciding on burn-in time and thinning required to get an approximately random sample from the posterior density from the MCMC output as the basis for inference. In Chapter 8 we apply this to the logistic regression model. This is a generalized linear model, and we find the maximum likelihood estimator and matched curvature covariance matrix using iteratively reweighted least squares. In the cases where we have a normal prior, we can find the approximate normal posterior by the simple updating rules we studied in Chapter 4. We use the Student's t equivalent as the heavy-tailed independent candidate density for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. After burn-in, a draw from the Markov chain will be random draw from the exact posterior, not the normal approximation. We discuss how to determine priors for this model. We also investigate strategies to remove variables from the model to get a better prediction model. In Chapter 9, we apply these same ideas to the Poisson regression model. The Proportional hazards model turns out to have the same likelihood as a Poisson, so these ideas apply here as well. In Chapter 10 we investigate the Gibbs sampling algorithm. We demonstrate it on the ηοΓηιαΙ(μ, σ 2 ) model where both parameters are unknown for both the independent prior case and the joint conjugate prior case. We see the Gibbs sampler is particularly well suited when we have a hierarchical model. In that case, we can draw a directed acyclic graph showing the dependency structure of the parameters. The conditional distribution of each block of parameters given all other blocks has a particularly easy form. In Chapter 11, we discus methods for speeding up convergence in Gibbs sampling. We also direct the reader to more advanced topics that are beyond the scope of the text.
Software
I have developed Minitab macros that perform the computational methods shown in the text. My colleague, Dr. James Curran has written corresponding R-Functions. These may be downloaded from the following website.
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Introduction to Bayesian Statistics
In the last few years the use of Bayesian methods in the practice of applied statistics has greatly increased. In this book we will show how the development of computational Bayesian statistics is the key to this major change in statistics. For most of the twentieth century, frequentist statistical methods dominated the practice of applied statistics. This is despite the fact that statisticians have long known that the Bayesian approach to statistics offered clear cut advantages over the frequentist approach. We will see that Bayesian solutions are easy in theory, but were difficult in practice. It is easy to find a formula giving the shape of the posterior. It is often more difficult to find the formula of the exact posterior density. Computational Bayesian statistics changed all this. These methods use algorithms to draw samples from the incompletely known posterior and use these random samples as the basis for inference. In Section 1.1 we will look briefly at the the ideas of the frequentist approach to statistics. In Section 1.2 we will introduce the ideas of Bayesian statistics. In Section 1.3 we show the similarities and differences between the likelihood approach to inference and Bayesian inference. We will see that the different interpretations of the parameters and probabilities lead to the advantages of Bayesian statistics.
THE FREQUENTIST APPROACH TO STATISTICS
In frequentist statistics, the parameter is considered a fixed but unknown value. The sample space is the set of all possible observation values. Probability is interpreted as long-run relative frequency over all values in the sample space given the unknown parameter. The performance of any statistical procedure is determined by averaging over the sample space. This can be done prior to the experiment and does not depend on the data. There were two main sources of frequentist ideas. R. A. Fisher developed a theory of statistical inference based on the likelihood function. It has the same formula as the joint density of the sample, however, the observations are held fixed at the values that occurred and the parameter(s) are allowed to vary over all possible values. He reduced the complexity of the data through the use of sufficient statistics which contain all the relevant information about the parameter(s). He developed the theory of maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) and found their asymptotic distributions. He measured the efficiency of an estimator using the Fisher information, which gives the amount of information available in a single observation. His theory dealt with nuisance parameters by conditioning on an ancillary statistic when one is available. Other topics associated with him include analysis of variance, randomization, significance tests, permutation tests, and fiducial intervals. Fisher himself was a scientist as well as a statistician, making great contributions to genetics as well as to the design of experiments and statistical inference. As a scientist, his views on inference are in tune with science. Occam's razor requires that the simplest explanation (chance) must be ruled out before an alternative explanation is sought. Significance testing where implausibility of the chance model is required before accepting the alternative closely matches this view.
Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson developed decision theory, and embedded statistical inference in it. Their theory was essentially deductive, unlike Fisher's. They would determine criteria, and try to find the optimum solution in the allowed class. If necessary, they would restrict the class until they could find a solution. For instance, in estimation, they would decide on a criterion such as minimizing squared error. Finding that no uniformly minimum squared error estimator exists, they would then restrict the allowed class of estimators to unbiased ones, and find uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimators (UMVUE). Wald extended these ideas by defining a loss function, and then defining the risk as the expected value of the loss function averaged over the sample space. He then defined as inadmissible any decision rule that is dominated by another for all values of the parameter. Any rule that is not inadmissible is admissible. Unexpectedly, since he was using frequentist criteria, he found that the class of admissible rules is the class of Bayesian rules. Other topics in this school include confidence intervals, uniformly most powerful tests of hypothesis, uniformly most powerful unbiased tests, and James-Stein estimation.
The disputes Fisher had with the Neyman are legendary (Savage, 1976) . Fisher strongly opposed the submerging of inference into decision theory and Neyman's denial that inference uses inductive logic. His specific criticisms about the NeymanPearson methods include:
• Unbiased estimators are not invariant under one-to-one reparameterizations.
• Unbiased estimators are not compatible with the likelihood principle.
• Unbiased estimates are not efficient. He scathingly criticized this waste of information as equivalent to throwing away observations. Nevertheless, what currently passes for frequentist parametric statistics includes a collection of techniques, concepts, and methods from each of these two schools, despite the disagreements between the founders. Perhaps this is because, for the very important cases of the normal distribution and the binomial distribution, the MLE and the UMVUE coincided. Efron (1986) suggested that the emotionally loaded terms (unbiased, most powerful, admissible, etc.) contributed by Neyman, Pearson, and Wald reinforced the view that inference should be based on likelihood and this reinforced the frequentist dominance. Frequentist methods work well in the situations for which they were developed, namely for exponential families where there are minimal sufficient statistics. Nevertheless, they have fundamental drawbacks including:
• Frequentist statistics have problems dealing with nuisance parameters, unless an ancillary statistic exists.
• Frequentist statistics gives prior measures of precision, calculated by sample space averaging. These may have no relevance in the post-data setting.
Inference based on the likelihood function using Fisher's ideas is essentially constructive. That means algorithms can be found to construct the solutions. Efron (1986) refers to the MLE as the "original jackknife" because it is a tool that can easily be adapted to many situations. The maximum likelihood estimator is invariant under a one-to-one reparameterization. Maximum likelihood estimators are compatible with the likelihood principle. Frequentist inference based on the likelihood function has some similarities with Bayesian inference as well as some differences. These similarities and differences will be explored in Section 3.3.
THE BAYESIAN APPROACH TO STATISTICS
Bayesian statistics is based on the theorem first discovered by Reverend Thomas Bayes and published after his death in the paper An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances by his friend Richard Price in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.
Bayes' theorem is a very clever restatement of the conditional probability formula. It gives a method for updating the probabilities of unobserved events, given that another related event has occurred. This means that we have a prior probability for the unobserved event, and we update this to get its posterior probability, given the occurrence of the related event. In Bayesian statistics, Bayes' theorem is used as the basis for inference about the unknown parameters of a statistical distribution. Key ideas forming the basis of this approach include:
• Since we are uncertain about the true values of the parameters, in Bayesian statistics we will consider them to be random variables. This contrasts with the frequentist idea that the parameters are fixed but unknown constants. Bayes' theorem is an updating algorithm, so we must have a prior probability distribution that measures how plausible we consider each possible parameter value before looking at the data. Our prior distribution must be subjective, because somebody else can have his/her own prior belief about the unknown values of the parameters.
• Any probability statement about the parameters must be interpreted as "degree of belief."
• We will use the rules of probability directly to make inferences about the parameters, given the observed data. Bayes' theorem gives our posterior distribution, which measures how plausible we consider each possible value after observing the data.
• Bayes' theorem combines the two sources of information about the unknown parameter value: the prior density and the observed data. The prior density gives our relative belief weights of every possible parameter value before we observe the data. The likelihood function gives the relative weights to every possible parameter value that comes from the observed data. Bayes' theorem combines these into the posterior density, which gives our relative belief weights of the parameter value after observing the data.
Bayes' theorem is the only consistent way to modify our belief about the parameters given the data that actually occurred. A Bayesian inference depends only on the data that occurred, not on the data that could have occurred but did not. Thus, Bayesian inference is consistent with the likelihood principle, which states that if two outcomes have proportional likelihoods, then the inferences based on the two outcomes should be identical. For a discussion of the likelihood principle see Bernardo and Smith (1994) or Pawitan (2001) . In the next section we compare Bayesian inference with likelihood inference, a frequentist method of inference that is based solely on the likelihood function. As its name implies, it also satisfies the likelihood principle. A huge advantage of Bayesian statistics is that the posterior is always found by a single method: Bayes' theorem. Bayes' theorem combines the information about the parameters from our prior density with the information about the parameters from the observed data contained in the likelihood function into the posterior density. It summarizes our knowledge about the parameter given the data we observed.
Finding the posterior: easy in theory, hard in practice
Bayes' theorem is usually expressed very simply in the unsealed form, posterior proprotional to prior times likelihood: g(9 u ..., 0 p |j/i,..., y") oc g{9 u ... ,Θ Ρ ) χ f(y u ..., y n |0i, ...,Θ Ρ ).
(1.1)
This formula does not give the posterior density g{6\,... ,9 p \yi,... ,y n ) exactly, but it does give its shape. In other words, we can find where the modes are, and relative heights at any two locations. However, it cannot be used to find probabilities or to find moments since it is not a density. We can't use it for inferences. The actual posterior density is found by scaling it so it integrates to 1:
where the divisor needed to make this a density is For other cases the integration has to be done numerically. This may be very difficult, particularly when p, the number of parameters, is large. When this is true, we say there is a high dimensional parameter space. Finding the posterior using Bayes' theorem is easy in theory. That is, we can easily find the unsealed posterior by Equation 1.1. This gives us all the information about the shape of the posterior. The exact posterior is found by scaling this to make it a density and is given in Equation 1.2. However, in practice, the integral given in Equation 1.3 can be very difficult to evaluate, even numerically. This is particularly difficult when the parameter space is high dimensional. Thus we cannot always find the divisor needed to get the exact posterior density. In general, the incompletely known posterior given by Equation 1.1 is all we have.
In Bayesian statistics we do not have to assume that the observations come from an easily analyzed distribution such as the normal. Also, we can use any shape prior density. The posterior would be found the same way. Only the details of evaluating the integral would be different. 
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The only difference would be the details of the integration. In most cases, it would have to be done numerically.
'Where the observation distribution comes from an exponential family, and the prior comes from the family that is conjugate to the observation distribution.
COMPARING LIKELIHOOD AND BAYESIAN APPROACHES TO STATISTICS
In this section we graphically illustrate the similarities and differences between the likelihood and Bayesian approaches to inference; specifically, how a parameter is estimated using each of the approaches. We will see that:
1. The likelihood and the posterior density are found in a similar manner, by cutting a surface with the same vertical hyperplane. However, the surfaces used in the two approaches have different interpretations and in most cases they will have different shapes.
2. Even when the surfaces are the same (when flat priors are used) the estimators are chosen to satisfy different criteria.
3. The two approaches have different ways of dealing with nuisance parameters.
The observation(s) come from the observation density f{y\B) where Θ is the fixed parameter value. It gives the probability density over all possible observation values for the given value of the parameter. The parameter space, Θ, is the set of all possible parameter values. The parameter space ordinarily has the same dimension as the total number of parameters, p. The sample space, S, is the set of all possible values of the observation(s). The dimension of the sample space is the number of observations n. Many of the commonly used observation distributions come from the one-dimensional exponential family of distributions. When we are in the one-dimensional exponential family, the sample space may be reduced to a single dimension due to the single sufficient statistic.
The Inference Universe
We define the inference universe of the problem to be the Cartesian product of the parameter space and the sample space. It is the p + n dimensional space where the first p dimensions are the parameter space, and the remaining n dimensions are the sample space. We do not ever observe the parameter, so the position in those coordinates is always unknown. However, we do observe the sample, so we know the last n coordinates. We will let the dimensions be p = 1 and n = 1 for illustrative purposes. This is the case when we have a single parameter and a single observation (or we have a random sample of observations from a one-dimensional exponential family). The inference universe has two dimensions. The vertical dimension is the parameter space and is unobservable. The horizontal dimension is the sample space and is observable. We wish to make inference about where we are in the vertical dimension given that we know where we are in the horizontal dimension.
Let f(y\6) be the observation density. For each value of the parameter Θ, it gives the probability density of the observation y for that parameter value. Actually, this formula is a function of both the value of the observation and the parameter value. It is defined for all points in the inference universe, thus it forms a surface defined on the inference universe. It forms a probability density in the observation dimension for each particular value in the parameter dimension. However in general, it is not a probability distribution in the parameter dimension. Figure 1 .1 shows the observation density surface in 3D perspective.
The likelihood function, first defined by R. A. Fisher (1922) , has the same functional form as the observation density, only y is held at the observed value, and Θ is allowed to vary over all possible values. Thus, it is a function of the parameter Θ. It is found by cutting the observation density surface with a vertical plane parallel to the Θ axis through the observed value. This is shown in Figure 1 .2. Likelihood inference is based entirely on the likelihood function.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We are trying to choose an estimator (function of the observations) to represent the unknown value of the parameter. In likelihood inference, the likelihood function cannot be considered to be a probability density in general. Because of this, Fisher (1922) decided that the best way to estimate the parameter is to choose the parameter value that has the highest value of the likelihood function, i.e., its mode. This is the parameter value that gives the observed data the highest probability. He named this the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). The mode will be invariant under any one-to-one transformation of the parameter space. Hence, the MLE will be invariant under any reparameterization of the problem.
2
Bayesian Estimation
Bayesian estimation requires that we have a probability distribution defined on the parameter space before we look at the data. It is called the prior density because it gives our belief weights for each of the possible parameter values before we see the data. This requires that we allow a different interpretation of probability on the parameter space than on the sample space. It is measuring our belief, and thus is subjective. The probability on the sample space has the usual long-run relative frequency interpretation. The prior density of the parameter is shown with the observation density surface in Figure 1 .3. The joint density of the parameter and the observation is found by multiplying each value of the observation density surface by the corresponding height of the prior density. This is shown in Figure 1 .4. Bayesians call joint density of the parameters and the observation "the full Bayesian model." It is clear that the full Bayesian model surface will not be the same shape as the sampling surface unless we use a flat prior that gives all possible parameter values equal weight. To find the posterior density of the parameter given the observed value we cut the joint density of the parameter and the observation with a vertical plane parallel to the parameter axis through the observed value of y. Thus, the likelihood and the posterior density are found by cutting different surfaces with the same hyperplane. The posterior density is shown in 3D perspective in Figure 1 .5. The posterior density is the complete inference in the Bayesian approach. It summarizes the belief we can have about all possible parameter values, given the observed data. The posterior will always be a probability density, conditional on the observed data. Because of this, we can use the mean of the posterior distribution as the estimate of the parameter. The mean of a distribution is the value that minimizes the mean-squared deviation. Hence, the Bayesian posterior mean is the estimator that minimizes the mean-squared deviation of the posterior distribution. the normed likelihood (likelihood function divided by its integral over the whole range of parameter values) will usually be a probability density. Thus, the likelihood function will have the same shape as the posterior density in this case. The Bayesian posterior mean estimator would be the mean value (balance point) of the likelihood function. This would not generally be the same value as the maximum likelihood estimator, unless the likelihood function is symmetric and unimodal such as in the normal likelihood. Figure 1 .7 illustrates the difference between these estimators on a nonsymmetric likelihood function that could also be considered a Bayesian posterior density with a flat prior density. The maximum likelihood estimator is the mode of this curve, while the Bayesian posterior estimate is its mean, the balance point. This shows the two estimators are based on different ideas, even when the likelihood function and the posterior density have the same shape. Note; we are not advocating always using flat priors. We only want to illustrate that when we do, the posterior will be the same shape as the likelihood. Hence, the likelihood can be thought of as an unsealed posterior when we have used flat priors. When the integral of the flat prior over its whole range is infinite, the flat prior will be improper. Despite this, the resulting posterior which is the same shape as the likelihood will usually be proper. For many models, such as the regression-type models that we will discuss in Chapters 8 and 9, it is ok to use improper flat priors. However, there are situations such as when we have a hierarchical normal model where improper priors should not be used for variance components. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter 10.
Multiple Parameters
When we have p > 2 the same ideas hold. However, we cannot project the surface defined on the inference universe down to a two-dimensional graph. With multiple parameters, Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1 .4, 1.5, and 1.6 can be considered to be schematic diagrams that represent the ideas rather than exact representations.
We will use the two-parameter case to show what happens when there are multiple parameters. The inference universe has at least four dimensions, so we cannot graph the surface on it. The likelihood function is still found by cutting through the surface with a hyperplane parallel to the parameter space passing through the observed values. The likelihood function will be defined on the the two parameter dimensions as the observations are fixed at the observed values and do not vary. We show the bivariate likelihood function in 3D perspective in Figure 1 .8. In this example, we have the likelihood function where θ\ is the mean and # 2 is the variance for a random sample from a normal distribution. We will also use this same curve to illustrate the Bayesian posterior since it would be the joint posterior if we use independent flat priors for the two parameters. 
Inference in the Presence of Nuisance Parameters
Sometimes, only one of the parameters is of interest to us. We don't want to estimate the other parameters and call them "nuisance" parameters. All we want to do is make sure the nuisance parameters don't interfere with our inference on the parameter of interest. Because using the Bayesian approach the joint posterior density is a probability density, and using the likelihood approach the joint likelihood function is not a probability density, the two approaches have different ways of dealing with the nuisance parameters. This is true even if we use independent flat priors so that the posterior density and likelihood function have the same shape.
Likelihood Inference in the Presence of Nuisance Parameters
Suppose that θ\ is the parameter of interest, and #2 is a nuisance parameter. If there is an ancillary 5 sufficient statistic, conditioning on it will give a likelihood that only depends on θ\, the parameter of interest, and inference can be based on that conditional likelihood. This can only be true in certain exponential families, so is of limited general use when nuisance parameters are present. Instead, likelihood 'Function of the data that is independent of the parameter of interest. Fisher developed ancillary statistics as a way to make inferences when nuisance parameters are present. However, it only works in the exponential family of densities so it cannot be used in the general case. See Cox and Hinkley (1974) . where L[ß\^2\data) is the joint likelihood function. Essentially, the nuisance parameter has been eliminated by plugging θ%\θι, the conditional maximum likelihood value of θ 2 given θ\, into the joint likelihood. Hence
L p (0i;data) = Ε(θι,θ2\θι\ data).
The profile likelihood function of #1 is shown in three-dimensional space in Figure  1 .9. The two-dimensional profile likelihood function is found by projecting it back to the / x θ\ plane and is shown in Figure 1 .10. (It is like the "shadow" the curve L (ßi, θ2\θ\, data) would project on the / x θχ plane from a light source infinitely far away in the #2 direction.) The profile likelihood function may lose some information about #1 compared to the joint likelihood function. Note that the maximum profile likelihood value of θ\ will be the same as its maximum likelihood value. However, confidence intervals based on profile likelihood may not be the same as those based on the joint likelihood.
